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are alleged to be, citizens of Washington, D. C. and two are citizens
of Maryland. To obtain complete federal adjudication of their rights
plaintiffs must sue each defendant in the district of which he is an
inhabitant. Thus plaintiffs must incur the expense of at least two distant suits-one in Washington and one in Maryland. The Washington
defendants could not be sued in Maryland over their objection; the
19
Maryland defendants could not be sued in Washington. * Also, all
of the defendants might very easily be indispensable parties. In such
event, if they continued their refusal to waive venue, suits brought in
either Washington or Maryland would be dismissed because of the
absence of the indispensable defendants. 20 Thus, the plaintiffs would
be completely barred from all access to the federal courts merely because
they were so unfortunate as to possess two perfectly good grounds for
substantive federal jurisdiction instead of only one.
An amendment to the statute striking out the objectionable word
"only" and allowing plaintiffs to sue in their own districts whenever
diversity of citizenship is shown would greatly clarify the situation.
JoHN T. KILPATRICK, JR.
Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Application to
Unexplained Automobile Accident
The Supreme Court of North Carolina recently applied the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur in a civil action for personal injuries arising out
of an unexplained automobile accident. That doctrine is often stated
as follows: "There must be reasonable evidence of negligence; but
where the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant
or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have the management use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by
Rubber & Celluloid Harness Trimming Co. v. John L. Whiting-J. J. Adams

Co., 210 Fed. 393 (D. Mass. 1913); Smith v. Detroit & T. S. L. R. R., 175
Fed. 506 (C. C. N. D. Ohio 1909); cf. Wilhelm v. Consolidated Oil Corp., 84
F. (2d) 739 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936); Newell v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 181 Fed. 698

(C. C. W. D. Penn. 1910).
IQ*Camp v. Gress, 250 U. S. 308, 39 S. Ct. 478, 63 L. ed. 997 (1919) ; Findlay

v. Florida E. C. Ry., 68 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); Ware-Kramer Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 178 Fed. 117 (C. C. E. D. N. C. 1910);
Schultz v. Highland Gold Mines Co., 158 Fed. 337 (C. C. D. Ore. 1907); Tice
v. Hurley, 145 Fed. 391 (C. C. W. D. Ky. 1906); Bensinger Self-Adding Cash
Register Co. v. National Cash Register Co., 42 Fed. 81 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1890).
Contra: Rawitzer v. Wyatt, 40 Fed. 609 (C. C. S. D. Calif. 1889) (partnership).
Conversely, where there is diversity of citizenship a suit brought in the district of
the residence of a plaintiff may be dismissed as to any other non-resident plaintiffs because as to them the venue is not laid in either the district of the residence
of the plaintiff or the defendant. Smith v. Lyon, 133 U. S. 315, 10 S. Ct. 303, 33
L. ed. 635 (1890).
2' Findlay v. Florida E. C. Ry., 68 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); see
Camp v. Gress, 250 U. S. 308, 316, 39 S. Ct. 478, 481, 63 L. ed. 997, 1003 (1919).
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the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care."1 The defendant was driving a car around a slight left curve on a dirt road at
a moderate rate of speed. The plaintiff was riding in the car as a guest.
Suddenly, the car started going toward the right, and continued to do
so until it ran off the road into a ditch, causing plaintiff's injuries. The
defendant testified that he attempted to turn the car back toward the
center of the highway, but, for some reason unknown to him, it failed
to respond to his efforts. Nor did the plaintiff- have any explanation for
the accident. He brought this action, alleging general negligence in
the operation of the automobile, and was nonsuited in the lower court
upon failure to produce any evidence of negligence. The Supreme Court
reversed this judgment, holding that the mere fact of the happening
of the accident raised an inference of negligence sufficient to take the
case to the jury.2
The court did not use the phrase "res ipsa loquiturt" in the course
of the opinion. However, this doctrine was clearly stated by the court.
as a basis for the decision in the following language: "When a thing
which caused an injury is shown to be under the control and operation
of the party charged with negligence and the accident is one which, in
the ordinary course of things, will not happen if those who have such
control and operation use proper care, the the accident itself, in the
absence of an explanation by the party charged, affords some evidence
that it arose from want of proper care." 3
The phrase "res ipsa loquitur," the English translation of which is
"the thing speaks for itself," was first used by Baron Pollock in 1863
in a case where a barrel of flour fell from a window and injured the
plaintiff.4 The development of the doctrine has led to wide-spread
confusion in the courts as to the types of accidents to which the doctrine applies 5* and as to the procedural effect of its application. 6* In
North Carolina it is held that it gives the plaintiff a printa facie case,
thus assuring the plaintiff that he will get his case to the jury, and
creates an inference of negligence which the jury may or may, not
accept.3*
1
Erle, C. J., in Scott v. London and St. Katherine Docks Co., 3 H. & C. 596,
601,'Etheridge
159 Eng. Rep.
665, 667 222
(1865).
v. Etheridge,
N. C. 616, 24 S. E. (2d) 477 (1943).
'Etheridge v. Etheridge, 222 N. C. 616, 619, 24 S. E. (2d) 477, 479 (1943).
'Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863).
'* For discussions of the various types of accidents to which the principle is
applied by North Carolina courts and courts of other jurisdictions see HARPEa,
LAw OF TORTS (1933) §77; PROSSER, TORTS (1941) §43; Note (1941) 19 N. C. L.
REv. 617.
'* For discussion of the procedural effect of the application of the principle
see Note (1941) 19 N. C. L. REv. 617.
7* Mitchell v. Saunders, 219 N. C. 178, 13 S. E. (2d) 242 (1941), commented
upon in Note (1941) 19 N. C, L. REv. 617; White v. Hines, 182 N. C. 275, 109
S. E. 31 (1921); Womble v. Merchants Grocery Co., 135 N. C. 474, 47 S. E.
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Although courts of other states have frequently applied the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine to suits arising out of injuries sustained in unexplained automobile accidents, 8 the principal case is significant because it is the first such application by a North Carolina court. All
previous attempts by counsel to have the doctrine applied to automobile
accident cases where there is no direct evidence of negligence have, on
facts distinguishable from those of the instant case, met with complete
failure. In some of these cases the court refused to draw an inference
of negligence because it appeared that the accident was caused by
unexplained skidding, saying that skidding often occurs without any
fault on the part of the driver and should, therefore, give rise to no
inference of negligence.9 Most courts agree,' 0 unless the defendant
is a common carrier." Where there has been a collision between two
moving vehicles, the court has refused to apply res ipsa loquitur without
much discussion.1 2 This would seem to be proper since there is no
reason to infer that one party rather than the other was negligent, and
since the injury cannot tefinitely be said to have been caused by the
operation of an instrumentality under the exclusive control of either
party. Most courts agree, but apply res ipsa loquitur where a moving
vehicle collides with one that is properly parked.-' Nor will the courts
apply the doctrine where all the facts and circumstances causing the
accident are known and testified to by witnesses, 14 nor where nothing
is shown other than that a person in the road was hit by an automobile.' 5 Other jurisdictions have applied r es ipsa loquitur where a parked
automobile has started into motion from an unknown cause and caused
493 (1904).

In White v. Hines, 182 N. C. 275, 287-288, 109 S. E. 31, 37-38,

the court said: "A prima facie case or evidence is that which is received or continues until the contrary is shown ....
Even if the prima facie case be called
a presumption of negligence, the presumption still is only evidence of negligence
for the consideration of the jury... In some of our decisions the expressions
res ipsa loquitur, prima facie evidence, prima face case, and presumption of negligence have been used as practically synonymous. As thus used, each expression signifies nothing more than evidence to be considered by the jury."
'Notes (1929) 64 A. L. R. 255, (1921) 12 A. L. R. 668.
'Clodfelter v. Wells, 212 N. C. 823, 195 S. E. 11 (1938); Butner v. Whitlow,
201 N. C. 749, 161 S. E. 389 (1931); Springs v. Doll, 197 N. C. 240, 148 S. E.
251 (1929).
10 Osborne v. Charbneau, 48 Wash. 359, 268 Pac. 884, 64 A. L. R. 251 (1928);
Sullivan v. Lutz, 181 Wis. 61, 194 N. W. 25 (1923) ; Linden v. Miller, 172 Wis.
20, 177 N. W. 909, 12 A. L. R. 665 (1920).
" Seney v. Pickwick Stages Northern Division, 82 Cal. App. 226, 255 Pac.
279 (1927); Carlson v. Kansas City, Clay County & St. Joseph Auto Transit
Co., 221 Mo. App. 537, 282 S. W. 1037 (1926).
12 Swainey v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 202 N. C. 272, 162 S. E.
557 (1932); Burke v. Carolina Coach Co., 198 N. C. 8, 150 S. E. 636 (1929).
' Hardman v. Younkers, 15 Wash. (2d) 473, 131 P. (2d) 177 (1942) ; Carson
v. Wilson, 56 Wyo. 218, 108 P. (2d) 260 (1940).
"'
Baldwin v. Smitherman, 171 N. C. 772, 88 S. E. 854 (1916).
9
" Rountree v. Fountain, 203 N. C. 381, 166 S. E. 329 (1932).
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damage to persons or property. 16 No case of this kind has arisen in
North Carolina.
It has been occasionally held 17 that res ipsa loquitur does not apply
where evidence of the true explanation of the accident is as readily
accessible to the plaintiff as to the defendant. A plaintiff riding in an
automobile as a passenger, as was the plaintiff in the principal case,
would usually be in a position to observe'as much about the cause of
an accident as a defendant driver of the vehicle. This requirement is,
however, of dubious validity. "It is difficult to regard this factor as
anything more than a makeweight, or to believe that it can ever be controlling. If the circumstances are such as to create a reasonable inference of negligence, it cannot be supposed that the inference ever
would be defeated by a showing that the defendant knew nothing about
what had happened; and if the facts give rise to no such inference, a
plaintiff who has the burden of proof in the first instance could scarcely
make out a case merely by proving that he knew less aboutthe matter
than his adversary."' 8
In addition to his allegation of general negligence, the plaintiff in
the principal case alleged as a specific act of negligence that the defendant had, immediately before the accident, passed another automobile
going in the same direction at a road intersection in violation of law.
The court held that this was immaterial due to lack of causal connection
with the accident. Courts have disagreed as to whether or not a plaintiff who has pleaded specific acts of negligehce is entitled to rely on the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.19 The court did not discuss this question
in the principal case, merely stating that the plaintiff's pleadings stated
negligence in general terms.
In 1935, the Court of Appeals of New York refused to apply the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to facts similar to those of the principal
case,20 despite an earlier New York case the other way.21 The basis
of the decision was that the probability that the automobile left the
highway because of the defendant's negligence was no greater than the
probability that the accident was caused by some mechanical failure.
The court in the principal case stated that there was no evidence of any
"6Ketchum v. Gillespie, 145 S. W. (2d) 215 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Biller

v. Meyer, 33 F. (2d) 440 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929); Sheridan v. Arrow Sanitary
Co., 105 N. J. L. 608, 146" Ati. 191 (1929).
Laundry
17
Wilson v. East St. Louis & Interurban Water Co., 295 Ill. App. 603, 15 N.
E. (2d) 599 (1938) ; Lynch v. Ninemire Packing Co., 63 Wash. 423, 115 Pac. 832,
A. 1917 E 178 (1911).
L. R.
16
§43.
1 9PROSSER, TORTS (1941)
(1938) 8 Noam DAME LAWYER 257.
Note
0
N. Y. 230, 196 N. E. 36 (1935); Note (1935) 13
267
v.
Busch,
" Galbraith
REv.
127.
L
Q.
U.
N. Y.
21
Bennet v. Edward, 239 App. Div. 157, 267, N. Y. Supp. 417 (1933).
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mechanical defect in the automobile, and did not discuss the point
further. The writer is in sympathy with the ruling of the North Carolina court, and thinks that it was proper to apply res ipsa loquitur to
the facts of the principal case, thus giving the plaintiff a chance to recover for damages which he probably sustained as a result of negligence
on the part of the defendant.
JoEL DENTON.

